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Abstract
During the early assembly missions the International Space Station could experience failures that
will leave it single fault tolerant or could seriously reduce it’s power generating capability.  These
failures or reduction in power generating ability could endanger the crew, the station or completely
bring ISS assembly to a halt until corrected.   Recent analysis and planning have been completed
that looked at critical  hardware failures and recommended work around strategies, manifesting of
spares or on-orbit stowage of spares.  The implementation of this analysis will allow ISS assembly
to continue with minimum impact.  This report describes how the analysis was brought about,  the
analysis process and finally the implementation strategy recommended and being put into place.
Introduction
On July 3, 1997, the International Space Station Program Office was conducting reviews of
program requirements in preparation for the fiscal year 1998 budget submittal. The Deputy
Program Manager for Operations, and the Deputy Program Manager for Development,  directed
the Logistics and Maintenance Team to review and update requirements for the procurement of
spares.  This initiated a four month programmatic study which resulted in new approaches to
supporting the Space Station hardware.
A great deal of work had been done prior to this effort to plan for Station maintenance, and to
procure the necessary spares and logistics products.  However, this planning had been done
based on analyses that were not yet mature.  Also, maintenance planning was conducted within
an assumed set of available resources.  The quantity of maintenance that can be performed,
and the timeliness of maintenance is tied directly to available resources such as upmass, on
board stowage, crew time, and spares quantities.  In this effort, better analyses came to the
forefront, changing the level of risk associated with assembly and activation of Station elements.
Commensurate with the new analyses, old assumptions about what resources could be made
available were revised.
The end result was a viable, coherent approach to supporting Station during the early assembly
phase.  This approach was characterized by maximizing the use of Shuttle performance, ag-
gressive on board sparing, protection of key resources for spares resupply, and identification of
new workaround hardware.  As this approach is implemented, the level of risk associated with
assembling, activating, and operating the Station during assembly will be dramatically reduced.
Executive Summary
This effort grew from a spares requirements review into a revision of the total support approach
for the Station.  It incorporated people and resources from across the Station Program, Shuttle
advise and assistance, and institutional support from three NASA centers.
Process
The Assembly Stage Critical Failures Planning Team was formed to develop an overall Assem-
bly Critical Failures Operations Plan for supporting ISS during the assembly phase and post
assembly. There were four sub-teams formed to assess on-orbit failures, develop spares re-
quirements and operational workarounds, develop new manifest requirements, and to identify
new hardware and associated costs. These teams had both serial and parallel tasks in order to
develop the operational support plan for ISS for the assembly phase, and carrying into the post
assembly phase.
Assembly Failures Solution Set
The major challenge of determining how to implement the new spares and hardware require-
ments led to an intense effort called the Assembly Failures Solution Set.  The stated purpose of
the Assembly Failures Solution Set was to define logistics carriers, on board internal/external
stowage locations, environmental protection services, and EVA/EVR requirements to accom-
plish spares deliveries and on board stowage during assembly
The Solution Set conducted an iterative set of sessions by which multiple disciplines exchanged
information to arrive at design and operations plans.  This was a combined effort between three
sub-teams, Launch Package Integration, Element Management, and Specialized Expertise.
Results
The teams met the original objectives as stated.  All ORU’s that are required to be pre-posi-
tioned had flights identified for their delivery that were before or on their need dates. All ORU’s
and workaround hardware that needed to be launched on the next flight after a failure had
flights identified for their pre-positioning with few exceptions. Those exceptions had plans
developed for them that would meet the support requirements.  Special planning considerations
were identified that will facilitate timely delivery of critical spares following an on board failure.
Pre-positioned ORUs were stored internally as much as possible, avoiding significant expense.
A Spares Warehouse concept was developed for those ORUs that had to be stored externally.
Concepts for operational workaround hardware were developed, assessed and refined such
that engineering groups can now perform the actual design and development work.
Workplan
The approach developed here requires extensive follow on work by a myriad of organizations
both within the Station Program, and at Center Institutions.  Some of the key tasks are updates
to maintenance plans, manifest changes, production diversion planning, on board stowage
planning, launch package integration, and new hardware development.  Numerous organiza-
tions have been assigned tasks to complete this work, and the necessary integration structure is
being put in place.  Accomplishment of this work will extend more than two years into the as-
sembly phase.
Conclusions
The Assembly Stage Critical Failures Planning Team was successful in establishing an ap-
proach and plan that satisfies the need to support critical assembly hardware.
This report is a snapshot of the new requirements, approach and planning for supporting the
International Space Station during assembly.  The real work for the Program is to successfully
put the new support in place, and use it to ensure successful assembly and operation of the
International Space Station.
Detailed Report
Background
The L&M Team had developed an analytical process for determining spares quantities which
took into account support factors such as hardware failure rates, failure effects, the resupply
cycle, and on board storage.  The quantitative analysis focused on the assembly complete
operations phase, and the results were reviewed for application to the assembly phase.  The
support factors were modeled, resulting in an ORU availability value.  ORU availability values
were compiled to the subsystem level, providing an indication of the operational availability.  As
the L&M Team changed the support variables, such as spares quantities or on board storage,
the effect on availability values was assessed.  As this process continued iteratively, the mix of
variables, including spare quantities, was optimized to improve operational availability.
In order to further optimize and validate the recommended quantities, system operators from
Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) were consulted.  This was to add a qualitative assess-
ment of spares quantities to the quantitative results.  As the meetings with MOD progressed,
issues surfaced about the ability to support the station during early assembly.  The assembly
stages from Flights 2A through 12A have limited failure tolerance and redundancy, especially in
the power and thermal systems.  After and 12A and 13A, a second Photo-Voltaic (PV) Array is
active, and the External Active Thermal Control System is operational.  Until then, however, the
Station is dependent on two power channels, and two thermal loops.  The solution to supporting
the early assembly phase is not simply spares quantities, but the ability to resupply spares
quickly when needed, and to store ORUs on board during early assembly stages.
The months of July and August were spent in developing recommendations for spares quanti-
ties, and assessing the supportability of the early assembly phases.  Periodically, the L&M Team
briefed the results to program management, usually the Deputy Managers for Development and
for Operations.  As the criticality of the assembly support issues became apparent, the Deputy
Manager for Development directed the team to determine how to solve this issue.
Purpose
The Assembly Stage Critical Failures Planning Team was formed to develop an overall Assem-
bly Critical Failures Operations Plan for supporting ISS during the assembly phase and post
assembly.  The Team was tasked to assess on-orbit failures, develop spares requirements and
operational workarounds, develop new manifest requirements, and to identify new hardware
and associated costs.
Team Structure
The team was co-chaired by the L&M Manager and the Vehicle Deputy Manager.  There were
four sub-teams formed.
• Team 1 - Failure Assessment
• Team 2 - Manifesting & Assembly Sequence Impacts
• Team 3 - Vehicle Hardware Impacts
• Team 4 - Spares/Costs
These teams had both serial and parallel tasks.  The Failure Assessment Team had to work
ahead of the other teams, as they were responsible for identifying the spares that needed to be
stored on board, and spares that had to be delivered to orbit immediately after a failure.  The
other teams began their work in parallel with Team 1, but needed the Team 1 results to perform
complete assessments.  The team tasks and work processes are shown in Figure 1.
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The Teams were also tasked to work concurrently to develop the operational support plan for
ISS for the assembly phase, and carrying into the post assembly phase.
Team 1 - Failure Assessment
Team 1 was composed of MOD system operators and Flight Directors and was chaired by a
MOD Flight Director Lead.  Team 1 tasks were to:
• Assess possible hardware failures during the assembly sequence
• Propose the initial plan to deal with failures and continue the assembly sequence
• Identify what is needed to make plan the workable
• Work concurrently with other teams to develop the overall Assembly Critical Failures Opera-
tions Plan
The Team 1 approach and process are shown in Figure 2.
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The Team 1 process provided results which fell into four categories:
• Spares that should be stored on-orbit
• Spares that should be carried to orbit on the next flight after a failure
• Spares that should be carried to orbit on the next flight after failure (oversized)
• Workarounds or special hardware that can delay the need for a spare
Team 2 - Manifesting & Assembly Sequence Impacts
Team 2 consisted of personnel from the Mission Integration  Team, and was led by the Assem-
bly and Manifest Lead.  Team 2 was tasked to:
• Assess the initial output from Team 1 to determine the impact to flight manifests and whether
an on demand spare must be flown on the next/soonest available flight
• Assess the recommended spares list to determine the impact to flight manifests in terms of:
• Orbiter performance
• Hardware off-load required
• Interface with the Shuttle program to implement changes
• Develop a “Fly on Next Flight After Failure” scenario
• Work concurrently with other teams to develop the overall Assembly Critical Failures Opera-
tions Plan
As Team 1 developed their inputs, Team 2 identified candidate flight manifests, and assessed
stowage availability.  Team 2 also reviewed the external spares, and determined which could be
transported and stored internally.  Although previous assessments had been done in this area,
these assessments were based on using existing internal racks, trays, etc.  Team 2 expanded
the list, by adding external spares that could be carried internally if additional Flight Support
Equipment (FSE) were developed.
Team 3 - Vehicle Hardware Impacts
Team 3 consisted of personnel from the Vehicle Team, and was led by a Vehicle Subsystem
Manager.
Team 3 was tasked to:
• Assess the output from Team 1 for development and cost of new hardware requirements to
implement operations workarounds, on-orbit spares storage, and ORU carriers/FSE.
• Assess the recommended spares list to determine the impact to the on-orbit vehicle, carri-
ers, FSE, etc.
• Work concurrently with other teams to develop the overall Assembly Critical Failures Opera-
tions Plan
Team 3 was responsible for defining logistics carriers, on board external stowage locations,
environmental protection services, and EVA/Robotics requirements to accomplish spares
deliveries and on board stowage during assembly.  In addition, Team 3 assessed the proposed
workaround hardware from Team 1 for technical feasibility.
Team 3’s tasks required design engineering expertise to support this effort.  The need and
criticality of performing a complete assessment in this area led to a follow-on effort, the Assem-
bly Failures Solution Set, described in section 3.4.
Team 4 - Spares/Costs
As the first three teams worked, Team 4 was responsible for identifying changes in recom-
mended spares quantities, production diversion requirements, and compiling costs.  Team 4
was led by Phil Shannahan.  Team 4 was tasked to:
• Consolidate outputs from Teams 1,2, and 3 for cost and cost phasing to implement
the overall plan
• Continue to assess the recommended spares list to refine cost requirements the
ORU level, and at subindentures below the ORU level
• Visit Original Equipment Manufacturers and vendors to refine costs
• Work concurrently with other teams to develop the overall Assembly Critical Failures
Operations Plan
The Assembly Failures Solution Set
“This is clearly worthwhile, we need to deal with these disconnects, I can’t think of a better use
of time than locking these people in a room.”  Deputy Program Manager for Development,
October 8, 1997
Throughout the month of September, the Team developed maintenance and operational
workaround plans for assembly failures that would threaten crew/station survival, or would
disrupt assembly.  The team developed a set of assembly critical failures, on board spares
requirements, operational workaround hardware proposals, and identified flight margins.  These
results were briefed to the Deputy Program Managers for Development and Operations on
October 9.  The consensus was that if the ISS program didn’t put in the place the ability to get
these spares to orbit when needed, and in some cases to keep them on board, then ISS assem-
bly could very well fail.
The next big step in this effort was to define how to implement these requirements.  The re-
sponse to the team’s proposal was the quote above.
The stated purpose of the Assembly Failures Solution Set was to define logistics carriers, on
board internal/external stowage locations, environmental protection services, and EVA/EVR
requirements to accomplish spares deliveries and on board stowage during assembly.  This was
a continuation of the work performed by Team 3 the prior month.
The Solution Set was led by Logistics & Maintenance lead for Maintenance and Resupply and a
representative from Element Management.  The 7A Launch Package Manager represented
Mission Integration and led the integration of the Launch Packages.  Three sub-teams were
formed:
• Launch Package Integration - Flight 7A Launch Package Manager.  Composed of:
Launch Package Teams
Flight Management & Integration Teams
• Element Management - External Stowage Element lead. Composed of:
Element Managers
Flight Elements & Systems
• Specialized Expertise - Logistics Spares Lead.  Composed of:
Mission Operations Directorate/Joint Operations Panel (MOD/JOP)
Vehicle Integrated Performance and Resources (VIPER)
Crew Office
Logistics Carriers
Hardware Allocation
Manifests, flight margins
Resource Management
Spares availability
EVA/EVR
NH3 Servicer
Orbiter Capabilities & Constraints
S&MA
The Solution Set conducted an iterative set of sessions by which the disciplines exchanged
information to arrive at design and operations plans.  This was a combined effort between the
three sub-teams.  The sub-teams identified potential storage sites, assigned spares and
workaround hardware to specific flights, identified logistics carriers and FSE, and developed
actions for implementation.  The intended result was a workable set of plans, by flight/stage,
that addressed the end to end process of transporting spares to orbit, transferring them to
Station, and where applicable, storing them on board.
Guidelines
The Solution Set needed an approach that would yield the desired results while minimizing cost
and minimizing Program changes.  Therefore, a set of guidelines was developed.  These guide-
lines were intended to help focus on least cost/least impact solutions.
Store as Much Inside as Possible
Many spare external ORUs needed to be stored on-orbit.  Storing external ORUs internally
avoids significant cost and effort over developing external storage accommodations.  Since the
internal environment is benign, no utilities are required for thermal conditioning.  The need is
avoided for special Flight Support Equipment (FSE) to interface the ORU to a support structure,
since internally most ORUs can be packed into trays or lockers.  Also, EVA time to transfer
external pre-positioned spares from the Shuttle bay to an external storage location can be
avoided by bringing the spare to orbit internally, and transferring it to the Station internal storage
volume.
With this in mind, a concerted effort was made to find ways to maximize the number of external
ORUs that could be stored internally.  Where external ORUs had to be stored externally, the
need for external accommodations was pushed out as late as possible, to delay the need for
funding the development of external storage hardware.
Pre-Position as Much as Possible
The assessment from MOD/JOP had showed that many critical spare ORUs could be stored on
the ground until a failure had occurred.  Those ORUs would then need to be manifested on the
next flight in order to restore the failed string prior to further assembly and activation activities.
However, if the spare could be stored on-orbit, it allowed the crew to restore the failed string
almost immediately.  This reduced system down time, and eased the strain of having numerous
candidate spares that could need to be manifested on very short notice.
Minimize Impact toExisting Hardware
Due to the state of design and manufacture of Station hardware, any design or configuration
change would be extremely costly.  Redesign was considered a last resort.  In that vein, the
teams tried to use current carriers and FSE as much as possible.
Stay Within Current Schedules/Assembly Sequence
The assembly sequence is an agreed-upon baseline that impacts international agreements if
changed.  The hardware manufacture and delivery schedules are also tied to the assembly
sequence, and changes to those could incur cost.  Changes to the assembly sequence were
avoided as much as possible, and plans were initiated that would help avoid disrupting the
assembly sequence in the event of a failure.  Hardware delivery schedules were looked at as
opportunities for “borrowing” a flight asset to use as a spare until an operations spares could be
procured and manufactured.  This option was especially attractive when hardware deliveries
were scheduled ahead of the ground assembly and integration dates.
Develop an Viable Approach for Program Implementation
The Solution Set did not want to establish new standing boards and programmatic overhead in
order to prepare for assembly critical failures.  Therefore, the intent was to bring together all the
necessary disciplines to identify and assess potential approaches, and determine the most
viable approach.  The disciplines could then identify the top-level requirements associated with
this support approach.  The support approach and the requirements set could then be handed
off to the appropriate existing Program teams for implementation.
External Storage Sites
Part of the process was the identification of potential external storage sites on a stage basis.
This helped the teams know how external storage volume could potentially be available, and at
what stage that volume could become available.  That provided the basis for the teams to trade
potential external storage approaches to determine the most technically feasible approach.
Element managers reviewed the design configurations of their elements, and assessed the
availability of potential stowage sites by stage.  This review was of elements delivered from
flights 2A through 12A.
• Node 1 -
Has numerous attach points for small items, available on 2A -
WIFs - Some needed only for assembly operations 2A - 7A.  One had no identified use.
Load limits on WIFs would be a concern if used for stowage of large spares.
Light interfaces & camera interfaces - Power connections available, could only be used
for small spares due to loads.
EVA installed handrail locations and slide wire brackets could be modified as ORU
attach points.
• Lab Module -
Has the Lab Cradle Assembly, available after 8A, could handle a SLP/ULC.
Also has static flight fittings which could handle small items, available after 5A.
• Z1 Truss Segment-
Has attach points used to deliver the S-Band RF Group, available after 4A.  CBM inter-
face could handle a small carrier.  Available after 12A.
• P6 Segment -
Two sites available along the P6 Long Spacer, one about 25 feet along the spacer, the
other about 10 feet along the spacer, below the EETCS Radiator.  Both have volume to
accommodate a carrier.  Available from 4A to 12A.
• Airlock-
Static flight fittings and trunnion pins.  Available after 7A.
• S0 Truss Segment -
Keel pins could accommodate a carrier.  Available after 8A.  Other truss elements as-
sessed by similarity to S0.
Flight by Flight Planning
A series of sessions was held in which each flight was considered for delivery of spares to orbit.
Each session was led by the launch package integration team.  The objective was to be able to
deliver each spare before or on it’s need date that had been identified by Team 1 (MOD/JOP).
The sessions were held sequentially, starting with flight 2A, and continued until all spares
requirements were met.  As many spares as practical were designated on each flight.  The
spares that could not be carried on that flight were rolled over to the next flight.  This allowed the
teams to get as many spares to orbit as early as possible.
Each flight was planned within the limits that were identified by the multiple disciplines that were
participating.  Some of the limitations were available upmass, available stowage capability, and
EVA accessibility by stage.
Results
The teams met the original objectives as stated.  All ORU’s that are required to be pre-posi-
tioned had flights identified for their delivery that were before or on their need dates. All ORU’s
and workaround hardware that needed to be launched on the next flight after a failure had
flights identified for their pre-positioning with the exception of the following:
• Direct Current Switching Unit
• Pump & Flow Control Subsystem
• Interface Heat Exchanger
• Control Moment Gyro Electrical Assembly
• Ammonia Servicer, Jumpers and Kit
Preparations are being made such that these ORUs can be launched on the next flight after an
on board failure occurs.  The action for planning and conducting the preparations for launching
after a failure was assigned to the Launch Package Managers.
In addition, there were some ORUs that are too large for integrating onto an existing flight.
These are ORUs have a critical impact upon failure, but also have a very low likelihood of
failure.  For these ORUs, the Assembly & Manifest Team is preparing a generic flight configura-
tion that can be substituted for a planned assembly flight relatively quickly.  The configuration of
Flight 7A.1, which includes a MPLM and a SLP, will be the basis for this generic flight.  This will
allow these oversized ORUs to be transported to orbit in a timely manner.  Additional cargo
would be added to the flight in order to fully utilize the upmass capability.
All ORUs that were pre-positioned can be stored internally with the following exceptions:
• DC to DC Converter Unit Coldplate
• Thermal Control System Pump Module
• Flex Hose Rotary Coupler
• Pump & Flow Control Subsystem
• Ammonia Servicer, Jumpers and Kit
These items are too large to fit through the hatches for IVA translation.
On Board Requirements
The assessment by Team 1 (MOD/JOP) resulted in the identification of spares that needed to
be pre-positioned on-orbit, spares that must be delivered to Station on the next flight after a
failure, and a set of hardware that was needed in order to perform operational workarounds in
the event of a failure.
On Board Pre-positioned Spares
The spares that Team 1 identified for on board pre-positioning were arrived at through a series
of JOP sessions which assessed the impact of on board failures by flight.  Team 1 identified the
need for a pre-positioned spare when the potential failure could endanger Station survival, the
ability of the crew to remain on board, or interrupt the assembly sequence before a spare could
be delivered on the next Shuttle flight.  This was based on their review of system capabilities,
demands, redundancies, and the ability to work around a failure.
Many of the spares that were identified were needed due to power demands.  The Team 1
assessment showed that as the assembly build progresses, power demands will increase to the
point that both power channels are required for operations.  This occurs at the 7A.1 stage,
requiring on board spares be available in the event of a failure.
Spares Warehouse
Spares that had to be pre-positioned were accommodated using internal stowage through most
of early assembly.  However, some large power and thermal ORUs were identified as being
required on board prior to 12A.  These ORUs are too large to store internally, and require exter-
nal storage.  No external storage capability exists in the Station baseline.  The teams evaluated
the potential external storage sites identified earlier.  The Airlock sites were the most promising.
The Airlock is installed in time to the meet the need date, and has external volume and attach
points that can potentially support a storage facility.  The available volume and attach points are
not affected by subsequent assembly, and should be available for the life of the program.  Also,
external power feeds are available nearby which can be tapped to provide power for heater
strips that would keep ORUs within required temperature limits.
A spares warehouse concept was developed to provide the capability to store large external
ORUs on board, with the power for heaters as needed.  This concept calls for a set of beams to
be mounted on the Airlock launch trunnions.  These beams would extend past the crewlock
such that a pallet can be mounted on the beams.  Payload Retention Latch Assembly (PRLA)
interface would be incorporated on the beams that would be similar to the PRLAs in the Shuttle
payload bay.  These PRLA type interfaces would secure the pallet to the beams.  Power for
heaters would be by a cable from a external power feed to the pallet.  In this configuration, any
pallet which is designed to ride across the cargo bay will also fit on these beams.  See Figure 3.
Workaround Hardware
In some cases, an operational workaround is more practical than providing a spare.  In these
cases, Team 1 developed an operational and functional concept for the hardware necessary to
perform the workaround.  Team 3 performed an initial assessment of the workaround hardware
to determine that it’s development is viable.
Figure 3  Spares Warehouse Concept
An example is the Ammonia Servicer, Jumpers and Kit.  A Photo-Voltaic (PV) Radiator failure
while P6 is mounted on Z1 can not be restored through radiator replacement prior to UF2.  The
most likely failure scenario for the radiator is a failure of a loop through Micro Meteoroid/Orbital
Debris (MM/OD) penetration.  There is no known method for manipulating such a massive ORU
until the Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS) can be operated from the Mobile
Base System (MBS).The MBS is not delivered until UF2.  A failure of the PV radiator would
require that power channel to be shut down, which, beginning with stage 7A.1, would leave
inadequate power to operate ORU heaters and the Lab.  The US Segment would also be zero
fault tolerant for power.
The proposed workaround is to provide a set of ammonia jumpers that connect to the radiator
interfaces and run to an EETCS radiator.  This would allow the EETCS radiator to provide
cooling to the PV Array, allowing that power channel to continue to operate.  An ammonia
servicer is also needed for this workaround, in order to charge the jumpers with ammonia, and
replenish ammonia that was lost as a result of the MM/OD strike of the PV Radiator loop.
Fly on Next Flight After Failure
Not all of the critical failures identified by Team 1 must be restored immediately.  Some can be
lived with temporarily.  In these cases, Team 1 identified the period in which the spare must be
delivered to orbit on the flight following a failure.  In the case of the power system, these failures
left the US segment zero fault tolerant for power, but did not immediately endanger the station
hardware or crew.  However, activation of the next element would require both power channels
be available.  Therefore, a spare would be delivered on the next Shuttle along with the next
assembly element, and installed prior to the element being installed and activated.
Where Team 1 identified a spare in this category, every effort was made to pre-position the
spare early.  This gave the Station crew the ability to restore the system prior to the next the
Shuttle flight.  This reduces the risk to an assembly and activation flight by having full system
capability available prior to Shuttle launch.
Essential planning considerations were identified for this category of spares.
• If a failure occurs on board, it may bump an ORU that was manifested for pre-positioning.
• The Shuttle Program should plan on providing power for any sidewall carrier, and the FSE
designer should have heater elements as a standard design feature.
• Both Programs will have to do enough cargo analysis to ensure that any one of the identified
spares can fly (loads and thermal analysis).
• When an ORU is flown after failure, the maintenance will be performed while the Orbiter is
present, requiring an additional EVA.  The Program will have to accept using the unsched-
uled EVA, or add the consumables to add an EVA to the flight.
Reconfigure Flight After Failure
A limited set of ORUs were identified that have a critical impact to Station upon failure, which,
due to their size and mass, would require reconfiguration of a flight to deliver to Station.  Fortu-
nately, these ORUs have a very low probability of failure.  Below is the listing of ORUs that fall
into this category.
• Ammonia Tank Assembly
• Nitrogen Tank Assembly
• Thermal Radiator Rotary Joint ORU’s
• Solar Array ORU’s
The Solar Array Wing is an example of the planning that addresses failures of these ORUs.  The
Wing consists of two Blanket Boxes and a Mast Canister.  These are delivered and deployed on
Flight 4A.  The most likely failure mode is a failure to deploy upon activation on 4A.  If this
occurs, it is not a situation that can be effectively dealt with spares.  The configuration of the
Station, with P6 mounted on Z1, precludes handling of these oversized ORUs.  The element
would either have to brought to ground for refurbishment, or left in place until additional handling
equipment can be brought to orbit to manipulate the ORUs.  Either case would require the
redesignation of an upcoming flight to correct the problem.  Once deployed, the probability of
failure is minimal.
The Assembly & Manifest Team is conducting the planning to reconfigure a flight on relatively
short notice for these contingencies.  The general approach is to pre-plan a flight configuration
such as 7A.1, with a SpaceLab Pallet and a MPLM.  The Program would use the opportunity to
also deliver additional ORUs and other cargo as necessary.
Workplan
Following is a summary of the forward work required to implement the findings of this study.
Maintenance Planning
Maintenance planning will be updated to reflect the changes of this study.  Tool lists, technical
data, training plans, etc., will be reviewed and modified to ensure that all on board resources are
available as needed.  The updated maintenance planning will be documented in the IDRD,
Annex 2, On-Orbit Maintenance Plan.  Annex 2 is published by Planning Period, and updates
through Planning Period 3 will cover the Assembly Critical Failures Planning.
Manifest Revisions
The On-Orbit Maintenance Plan is the Program input to IDRD Annex 1, Station Cargo Manifest.
Annex 1 and 2 will be updated to reflect manifesting of spares and workaround hardware.
Annex 1 is published by flight, and will be updated for those flights through Planning Period 3
affected by Assembly Critical Failures Planning.
Hardware Utilization Board
Requirements for diverting production assets for use as spares have been submitted to the
Hardware Utilization Board (HUB).  The HUB is responsible for identifying specific assets by
serial numbers, and providing that information for incorporation into maintenance planning and
manifest development.  Where an asset is not available, the HUB is responsible for raising that
as an issue to the Program.
Stowage Plans
nternal stowage of spares and workaround hardware was assessed from a volumetric stand-
point to determine that the approach is viable.  The Cargo Integration Team is conducting more
detailed assessments to determine definite stowage locations and accommodations.
Hardware Development
The new hardware concepts have been assigned to Vehicle team leads for implementation.
Each lead is responsible for the Design, Development, Test & Evaluation (DDT&E) of their
hardware items, including gaining approval for necessary changes to the Program baseline.
Each lead is responsible for the technical, budgetary and schedule management of their hard-
ware.
Conclusions
The Assembly Stage Critical Failures Planning Team was successful in establishing an ap-
proach and plan that satisfies the need to support critical assembly hardware.  The support
begins with Flight 2A, maximizes the spares available on board to respond to critical failures,
identifies new workaround capabilities, and supports through the 12A stage.  The appropriate
Program teams have been assigned the tasks necessary to implement the new requirements,
and the necessary integration structure is being put into place.
This is an on-going process.  Launch Package Managers are responsible for integrating the new
spares and hardware onto their flights, and reporting and resolving issues.  Subsystem manag-
ers are responsible for new hardware development to meet manifest schedules and reporting
and resolving issues.  The L&M Team is responsible for implementing maintenance planning
and assessing the impacts to on-orbit supportability as hardware and manifests change.  The
L&M Team is also responsible for providing an integrated picture to Program Management of
progress as it is made in implementing this new support plan.
This report is a snapshot of the new requirements, approach and planning for supporting the
International Space Station during assembly.  The real work for the Program is to successfully
put the new support in place, and use it to ensure successful assembly and operation of the
International Space Station.
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